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A challenge facing organizations is that of amalgamating possibilities which do not exist in a transparent and concentrated form, but rather as
dispersed individual cognitive ‘pictures’ perceived by managers embedded in business networks. Based on our research of business networks
involving manufacturers of consumer goods, pharmaceutical companies, producers of semiconductors and telecommunication and utility service
providers, we propose the concept of network insight, which does not consist merely of extant pictures held by individual managers, but is
grounded in the practice of inter-firm exchange. We argue that developing network insight is a managerial challenge encompassing the
amalgamation of dispersed pieces of atomized network pictures through heedful, multilateral interactions. Such a managerial activity transcends
the task-specific knowledge base of managerial cognition and leads to objectified organizational learning within a business network. Managers
that develop insight in business networks are able to mobilize other actors and create a competitive advantage for their organization that is crucial
for innovation and growth.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Keywords: Cognition; Sense-making; Representations; Insight; Networks1. The problem of developing network insight
It is commonly argued that business networks that include
organizations of different types, in general provide the relevant
context for organizational practice (Anderson, Håkansson, &
Johanson, 1994; Uzzi, 1997; Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003) and
marketing in particular (Achrol, 1997; Achrol & Kotler, 1999).
The challenge that companies face within these ‘communities of
practice’ when strategizing (Gadde, Huemer, & Håkansson,
2003) consists of amalgamating the possibilities for action; all
of which do not exist in a transparent and concentrated form, but
solely as dispersed individual cognitive ‘pictures’ held by
managers who are in a network. These atomized and often
contradictory ‘network pictures’ (Ford, Gadde, Hakansson, &
Snehota, 2003; Henneberg, Mouzas, & Naudé, 2006) refer to
their extant understanding that different managers have of⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 77 666 45 275.
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doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2007.01.003surrounding networks in terms of actors, interactions, and
means–end relationships (Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994;
Johnson, Daniels, & Asch, 1998; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985).
Network pictures can, therefore, be given realist status akin to
‘extant knowledge’. Extant experiences, for example, enable
actors to select certain aspects from the flow of events and build
categories or schemata of understanding (Hodgkinson, 2001;
Weick, 1979). One would be tempted to rush into a straight-
forward response to the challenge of integrating these individ-
ually held network pictures, by claiming that managers need to
search for several individual pictures and compare them by using
complementary elements in order to form an integrated
perspective. This, however, is not sufficient. Networking (Ford
et al., 2003) within communities of practice does not flow
directly out of a multitude of network pictures but requires further
interactions and exchange processes before insights are gained
(Tsoukas, 2000). Consider a business manager who investigates
entry into a new business network. The network pictures that he
may obtain regarding customers' issues and competitive
dynamics are, arguably, useful first impressions. However, can
he be sure ab.out the underlying logic and interests of his
customers? Can he rely on the views that he obtained without any
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also a business manager who finally closes a business deal by
taking into account all important task-specific requirements. Is
this deal the best possible solution for both parties? Or does the
manager leave riches on the negotiation table by ignoring non-
task related interests of the other contracting party? Is a business
deal sustainable if it is based on a thorough investigation and
comparison of a multitude of individual cognitive ‘pictures’ held
by business actors? It is these types of questions that underpin the
problem of developing network insight.
There are two reasons why further interactions and exchange
processes are needed in order to address the challenge of
amalgamating dispersed cognitive pictures in a business
network. Firstly, managers' cognitive pictures are continually
re-configured to resolve inherent conflicts and exploit oppor-
tunities through activities and negotiations undertaken by the
organizations in their intermediate network. Moreover, cogni-
tive pictures impact on each other at different levels: at the
individual ‘carrier’ level, invariably at the level of an individual
manager in a management team, at the intra-company rela-
tionship level between individuals in management teams, and at
the inter-company network level (Lyles & Schwenk, 1992).
Thus, organizations cannot fully construct and explain in
advance all individual views held by other actors, nor can these
views be anticipated to be stable. Secondly, differential knowl-
edge for positioning and acting within a network which is the
basis for organizations' innovative action is not self-contained
in network pictures, but emerge as a set of possibilities through
enacted tensions and the formation of discrepancies. Clearly,
possibilities are not engrained in cognitive representations.
Instead, they ‘develop’ as strategic options and need to be
elaborated through interactions and specific exchange activities
(Beinhocker, 1999; Luehman, 1998; McGrath, Ferrier, &
Mendelow, 2004; Williamson, 1999).
While optimization through adding and comparing individ-
ual cognitive ‘pictures’ is less helpful, many organizations rely
on the implicit importance of rules which include a set of
methods, standards or routines (March & Olsen, 1989; March &
Simon, 1993). A set of managerial methods may help to over-
come the problems of individually held network pictures, such
as those described above. For this reason, we propose mana-
gerial methods to develop insight in business networks, which
does not merely consist of the pictures of individual players but
comprises objectified knowledge for positioning and acting. We
characterize network insight as ‘objectified’ because it consists
of a set of shared data, information or facts. Network insight can
be seen as the outcome of continuous and iterative interplay
between the factual physical and social artifacts that surround
actors in networks of exchange relationships as well as the
cognitive schemata constructed and shaped from actors' past
experience and precedents. We have chosen the title developing
network insight deliberately to emphasize the inherently devel-
opmental and indeterminate nature of the ‘network insight’.
Each inter-organizational network consists of pre-existing
interaction and exchange relationships and evolutionary
dynamics that continually reshape what is feasible and what is
successful. Through the construct of ‘network insight’ wedescribe the emergence of a set of possibilities open to each
organization within that network; and argue that network insight
can lead to a competitive advantage within a business network
as well as for the business network itself. This paper presents a
procedural map for developing insight to business networks. We
describe the amalgamation process of individual, cognitive
pictures as the basis on which managers can step aside from
extant knowledge in order to develop an objectified narrative
and assessment of the situation in which they are embedded. We
then analyze important enablers and barriers to developing
network insight. We argue that developing network insight is a
managerial challenge that requires the ability to cope with the
complexities of a) multilateral exchange, b) manifold rational-
ities, and c) recursive time. We then move on to illustrate via
two cases the inherent difficulties of companies developing
network insight. The first case represents successful manage-
ment of the process of developing network insight, while the
second exemplifies inherent errors and deficiencies. We finally
present conclusions and guiding principles for business man-
agers and management teams.
2. Previous research: three management perspectives
We now present previous research organized via three
perspectives: 1) networks, 2) knowledge and 3) collective mind.
Theoretical ideas contained in these three perspectives are
abstract, interrelated and, often, overlapping or contradictory
assertions. We summarize their relevant input (without neces-
sarily always resolving their contradictions) in terms of concep-
tual tools and move on to propose a framework that illustrates
the process of amalgamating dispersed network pictures into
network insight.
2.1. Network perspective
The network perspective is entrenched in the recognition of
markets as networks of exchange relationships (Axelsson, 1992;
Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Halinen,
Salmi, & Havila, 1999; Kranton & Minehart, 2001; Stevenson
& Greenberg, 2000). The view of markets as interconnected
networks of exchange relationships prompted a whole gener-
ation of researchers to analyze and describe the characteristics
of these networks (Ford, 1998; Anderson et al., 1994; Easton,
1992; Easton & Håkansson, 1996; Ford et al., 2003; Håkansson
& Snehota, 1994; Håkansson & Ford, 2002; Ritter, 1999;
Turnbull, Ford, & Cunningham, 1996; Wilkinson & Young,
2002). Network pictures are a central concept to the network
perspective. They describe the mental representations, or cogni-
tive maps, of relevant network characteristics as internalized
through the eyes of involved actors (Bougon, Weick, &
Binkhorst, 1977; Huff, 1990; Ford et al., 2003). The attempt
to portray network characteristics and provide a plausible
narrative for past events, current positions and future develop-
ments, can be traced back to Johanson and Mattsson's (1992)
‘network theory’. Network pictures are the actor's ‘network
theory’ (Mattsson, 2002b). As with Weick's (1995) notion of
sense-making, network pictures are actively contributing to the
169S. Mouzas et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 37 (2008) 167–180process of organizations' and network's identity construction
through individual sense-making and representational processes
(Holmen & Pedersen, 2003). Network pictures are retrospective
in the sense that they provide a plausible representation of
recent–past events and current positions; yet also offer
prospective in that they shape organizations' future options
(Weick, 1979, 1988).
Notwithstanding the intellectual debate regarding network
pictures (as well as related discussions in the strategy literature
about competitive groups and also cognitive maps in the
organizational behavior literature) (Bogner & Thomas, 1993;
Bougon, 1992; Bougon et al., 1977; Daft & Weick, 1984;
Daniels, Johnson, & de Chernatony, 2002; de Chernatony,
Daniels, & Johnson, 1993; Eden, Ackermann, & Cropper, 1992;
Fiol & Huff, 1992; Hodgkinson, 1997; Hodgkinson & Johnson,
1994; Huff, 1997, 1990; Osborne, Stubbart, & Ramaprasad,
2001; Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Stubbart, 1989;
Spender, 1998), there have been few attempts to rigorously
conceptualize the underlying dimensions of such network
representations and to test their applicability in the authentic life
of organizations (Cova, Mazet, & Salle, 1998) or to link their
characteristics to performance outcomes (McNamara, Deep-
house, & Luce et al., 2003; McNamara, Luce, & Tompson et al.,
2002). There are ample attempts in related areas such as the
work on constructed and emergent elements of sense-making
that provide valuable input (Hodgkinson, 2001). Henneberg
et al. (2006) provide an extensive review of previous work on
network pictures in the business-to-business marketing litera-
ture and propose a parsimonious set of eight interrelated dimen-
sions. Their study demonstrates that the utilization of the
different dimensions is primarily determined by what it is that
managers wish to represent, within a specific task-oriented
environment. As there is no definitive notion of abstract or
‘correct’ network picture, Ford et al. (2003) argue that the
different managers involved will naturally have their own
individual views. These individual cognitive representations
matter as they provide the foundation for organizational activity,
yet they do so without reifying the organization as an ‘actor’
(Meindl, Stubbart, & Porac, 1994). Managers' cognitive repre-
sentations of the network and its characteristics can be seen as
embracing an individual's ‘frame of reference’, including
cognitive limitations. It could, therefore, be argued that network
pictures describe a specific and limiting framework of bounded
rationality (Simon, 1976, 1979) which prevents the individual
actors from knowing all network possibilities, or remembering
all previous solutions or spending time and resources to perform
complex but necessary calculations with regard to all available
options (Simon, 1991; Witt, 2000). Therefore, it can be posited,
in line with Simon (1976), that as soon as managers pass a
‘satisfycing’ threshold of sense-making in networks, they rely
on the resultant network pictures and stop their attempt to attain
further optimization. The concept of ‘satisfycing’ may also be
linked to the notion of ‘aspiration level’ in cognitive psychol-
ogy, which describes a coping strategy that is easier to carry out
than continuous and complex processes of optimization (Simon,
1997). This is clearly evident in many managerial decisions
within the network context, such as entering, launching or re-launching a new product or service; or entering a new market
where many contextual variables are not known or difficult to
estimate. Simon (1997) argues that the notion of satisfycing must
be connected to the notion of search. In this way ‘search’ for
information or solutions ceases as the satisfycing level is
achieved. Simon (1979), of course, did not refer to any idea of
sense-making. In theoretical terms, ‘sense-making’ unlike
‘search’ is generally conceived as a continuous accomplishment
and emergence. Although sense-making is never completed, this
does not imply that sense, made at a certain time, does not de facto
serve as the basis of action. Confronted with incomplete
information,managersmay pass the satisfycing threshold because
of the existence of a) ‘cost rationality’ which involves the cost
of further observation, communication or calculation, and
b) ‘truly bounded rationality’ which refers to “not knowing the
implications of everything one knows” (Radner, 1996, p.1360);
managers may also pass the satisfycing threshold because of an
inherent ‘indeterminacy’ that implies a multiplicity of solutions.
What managers therefore need is a coherent framework of
methods or processes to overcome these problems. Managers
need to integrate their bounded and diverse cognitive pictures
for organizational purposes because organizations act as a single
entity, and business-to-business relationships can only prosper
once congruent ‘network identities’ at an organizational level
have been accomplished (Ring & van de Ven, 1994). This
managerial need shares similarities with the concept of ‘network
capability’ (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Ritter, Wilkinson, &
Johnston, 2002) which refers to the capability that allows
groups, individual companies or whole business networks to
comprehend complex situational demands such as unexpected
events that evolve rapidly. This capability is characterized by an
objectified ‘boundedness’, i.e. it is not resultant merely from
individual bounded rationalities but provides a means to
pushing the collective boundaries of sense-making into an
interactive realm.
One way to overcome the problem of congruence and in-
tegration of individual cognitive pictures is to follow Anderson
et al.'s (1994) suggestion that multiple network pictures need to
be collected in a more systematic and possibly longitudinal
fashion. Their suggestion is to use case studies that capture
longer time periods and gather material from different functions,
both within an organization and from different organizations.
However, they do not indicate a process or theoretical
mechanism of how this multiplicity is useful and how it could
be used for strategizing (Ford, McDowell, & Tomkins, 1998).
Organizational theory recommends ‘merging’, ‘overlaying’ or
‘congregating’ multiple cognitive maps (Bougon, 1992; Eden,
1989; Eden, Jones, & Sims, 1983), but again without procedural
indication of what this implies. Similarly, other empirical
studies highlight the importance for managers to understand the
ways or processes of sense-making (Hodgkinson, 2001) in
relation to their interaction and exchange activities. In this way,
the debate concerning sense-making as a process rather than
product in organizational theory (Czarniawska, 2004; Jeffcutt,
1994) reinforces the argument for the use of case studies to
investigate the development of network insight because the use
of a case-based method can address interaction and exchange
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active use of network pictures is not simply a matter of numer-
ical sufficiency. Network pictures are atomized constructions
that are inferred and interpreted from a variety of cues rather
than objectively given. All elements of network pictures imply
extant knowledge linked to the tasks at hand that shape
individual managers' perceptions (Anderson et al., 1994;
Daniels et al., 2002; Möller & Halinen, 1999). They can be
interpreted as a sign of what individual managers' sense is
important for them and their organization, but not as a signal
germane to the development of ‘network competences’ or an
abstract grasp of network properties or additional abstract
strategic network options (Ritter, 1999, 2000). Due to their
individual character, network pictures are a personal interpre-
tation of the network context (Mattsson, 2002b; Gadde et al.,
2003). Moreover, network pictures are enacted in the sense that
existing business networks are interpreted and constructed by
the organizations' own initiatives. Their properties are actor-
centered as they comprise elements such as the network horizon
(Holmen & Pedersen, 2003) or boundary, centrality, distance,
actor, relevance information flow and exchange relationships
(Henneberg et al., 2006; McLoughlin & Horan, 2000). At the
same time, the theoretical discussion of network pictures ob-
scures one important point. Namely, there is a significant
difference between what is factually possible in a network and
what is conceivable by an organization or individual using their
specific network pictures. Concepts such as those of network
pictures, which ignore this distinction, are unsuitable for
bounding a framework that explains and improves practice.
To be useful to managers, a theoretical construction needs to be
grounded in a deep understanding of the practice of inter-
organizational exchange (Biggart & Delbridge, 2004). Network
pictures alone are insufficient for organizational practice, in the
sense of providing differential advantages. Managers who rely
on their individual network pictures might be blinkered. As
atomized constructs, managers' network pictures have not been
tested within inter-organizational exchange processes, nor have
they been linked to cognitive processes (Meindl et al., 1994).
They constitute ad-hoc theorizing on cognitive structure that
may be removed from reality. While network pictures are
undeniably valuable as formulators of organizations' identity
construction, their appropriateness for a thorough understand-
ing of networks and strategic networking remains limited. As
cognitive representations, network pictures need proper ‘trans-
lation’ through several stages of inter-organizational exchanges
before they become amalgamated and, as such, ‘objectified’
(Mattsson, 2002a, 2003).
2.2. Knowledge perspective
While the network perspective qualifies our understanding of
cognitive representational constructs resembling network pic-
tures, we need to explore the knowledge perspective to un-
derstand the components of network insight. Developing a
knowledge approach to economic problems, Hayek (1945)
articulated in a forceful and clear way the idea that the economic
problem in a society is in fact a problem of the utilization ofknowledge not given to anyone in its totality. Hayek formulated
this problem in the following way:
“The peculiar character of the problem of rational economic
order is determined precisely by the fact that knowledge of
circumstances of which we must make use never exists in
concentrated or integrated form, but solely as dispersed bits
of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge
which all separate individuals possess. The economic
problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to
allocate given resources. It is rather a problem of how to
secure the best use of resources known to any of the
members of society, for ends whose relative importance only
these individuals know” (1945, p. 519).
Developing the macro-realities of a whole society, to the
realities of individual firms, Tsoukas (1996) paraphrased
Hayek's problem by stating that “…the organizational problem
firms' face is the utilization of knowledge which is not, and
cannot be, known by a single agent” (p. 11). This agent might be
within or outside the borders of the company. In an attempt to
refine the view of what organizations constitute, Tsoukas
(1996). considers organizations as being in constant flux, and
argues that at any point in time, a firm's knowledge is the
indeterminate outcome of actors attempting to manage the
inevitable tensions between a) normative expectations, b) dis-
positions from the past and c) local contexts. The consequence
of these tensions is that the potential for the emergence of novel
practices is never exhausted. Normative expectations, for
example, could take the form of roles; but also the form of
internal or external pressures to act in a certain way, or indeed of
task-related contingencies. Dispositions include sedimented
experience; but also the various form such as plans, reviews,
statistics and maps/matrices in which information appears.
Moreover, local context comprises all specific space-temporal
conditions such as the maturity of industry, existing organiza-
tional and inter-organizational structures as well as access to the
right people at the right time. Building on Giddens' (1984)
duality between structure and action, Hargadon and Fanelli
(2002). suggest that organizational knowledge is the product of
an on-going and recursive interaction between knowledge, as
empirical action, and knowledge as a possibility. In their view,
knowledge as action encompasses the factual physical and
social artifacts that surround actors in organizations, while
knowledge as a possibility comprises the schemata constructed
and shaped from actors' past experiences. The duality implies
that actors' knowledge of action is experienced through the lens
of existing cognitive schemata. Hargadon and Fanelli (2002)
conclude that the generation of new knowledge or successful
replication of old knowledge depends on the cyclic interaction
between the ‘matter’ of the knowledge as an action and the
‘energy’ that resides in knowledge as a possibility.
Our knowledge may be linked to various objects; for
example, objects may be simple or complex, social or material,
abstract or concrete, and are characterized by their relations.
However “… neither objects nor their relations are given to us
transparently: their identification is an achievement and must
be worked for” (Sayer, 1984, p.88). Therefore, our knowledge
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to which they do, or do not, truly represent or correspond to the
world” (Hunt, 1990, p. 11). While the knowledge perspective
emphasizes the inherently imprecise and indeterminate nature
of knowledge, the contemporary management literature is rich
with examples of how business opportunities emerged as a by-
product of actions with a different purpose, rather than as
intended outcomes of deliberate views and choices (Mintzberg,
1979; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). One explanation for these
empirical findings is that business opportunities, which
organizations exploit, can only be identified if organizations
are specifically prepared for them (Denrell, Fang, & Winter,
2003). It appears, however, that this line of argument misses a
crucial attribute of this ‘achievement’ or ‘preparation’ process.
The challenge of embracing the new business opportunities,
which are dispersed in an organization's surrounding network,
requires a deep insight into what is feasible. This insight is
grounded in the inherent negotiations and interactions in a
business network; which are regarded as managerial activities
embedded in exchanges (Spender, 1998). A ‘preparation
process’ is particularly useful in knowledge-intensive exchanges
where the institutionalization of cognitive frameworks, in the
sense of shared mindsets, provides the ‘architecture’ for on-going
and regular exchanges (Boisot, 1995; Karamanos, 2003). This
‘architecture’ can be compared to discursive institutions which
codify the parties' knowledge about efficient ways to interact and
transform transactions into discussions “… by which parties
come to reinterpret themselves and their relation to each other by
elaborating a common understanding of the world” (Sabel, 1994,
p. 138).
2.3. Collective mind perspective
In order to fully comprehend the notion of insight in business
networks and the process of achieving it, a deeper understand-
ing of its characteristics is needed. Research into managerial
cognition in the organizational behavior literature can provide a
valuable contribution. Such benefits can be gained if we
consider specifically the process of achieving ‘collective’
Collective mind is taken as a construct of integration through
interaction. Interaction among actors transfers knowledge and
hence alters the actors' minds. This is not fully represented in
one person but ‘collective’ and, therefore, it is partially over-
lapping between individuals while only partially developed in
each individual (Wiley, 1988; Weick & Roberts, 1993). The
idea of collective mind is not fully integrated in Weick's work
on ‘sense-making’ (e.g. Weick, 1993, 1995); nonetheless it can
be used as a pointer to the process of successful amalgamation
of individual cognitive pictures. In this way, the idea collective
mind shares some similarities with the theoretical construct of
‘common knowledge’ (Grant, 1996; Grant & Baden-Fuller,
2004). The integration of dispersed cognitive pictures into
‘common knowledge’ can be seen as the product of continuous
and iterative interplay between the factual physical and social
artifacts that surround actors in organizations and the cognitive
schemata constructed and shaped from actors' past experiences
and precedents Hargadon and Fanelli (2002). Thus, in terms ofindividual cognitive ‘pictures’ held by managers, these are
amalgamated through interactions within and between organi-
zations into a collective understanding of the network: that is,
the ‘insight’. Whilst mutually shared fields of representation
exist (Asch, 1952), this notion of network insight, understood
as the collective mind, introduces the possibility that simple
actors can comprehend highly complex environments that
encompass embedded strategic options. Interrelations are
crucial for this purpose because the ‘mind’ or ‘insight’ is
located in the connections between business actors. Conse-
quently, individual actors can only build collective mind via the
interrelation with other actors. Network insight can therefore be
termed to be ‘social’; and as such it is not stable but changes
incrementally with further interrelations; it is collective but
not reified (Weick & Roberts, 1993). The process of achieving
‘collective mind’ via heedful interactions will be elaborated
upon below.
While describing network insight as a sense-making capacity
within an on-going system of interactions, this does not clarify
how it is procedurally achieved. It begs the question of what
kind of interactions foster insight in business networks? How
are individual cognitive ‘pictures’ that are held by managers
transformed into ‘insights’? Taking our cues again from the
notion of a ‘collective mind’, it follows that the transformation
process as an amalgamation of network pictures is linked to the
‘heed’, expressed in the interrelation activities, e.g. negotiations
(Ryle, 1949). Heed is defined as a “disposition to act with
attentiveness, alertness, and care” (Weick & Roberts, 1993,
p. 374). Heedful interactions cause the actors to be tightly
coupled. They are characterized by rich and manifold connec-
tions between actors of all levels within the network system.
Long-time horizons for interactions that are concerned with
prospective as well as retrospective activities, rich interactions
between hierarchies and functions beyond mere task-specific
contact, and an integration of manifold levels of experiences
within each of the interactions are elements of heedful processes
fostering the collective mind. Stress is put on the coordination
of actions (not necessarily on cognitive alignment); although
respect and trust being more important than agreement per se.
Heedful interactions acknowledge diversity as a positive
element in creating collective mind situations (Weick &
Roberts, 1993). Specific emphasis is on ‘actions’ as the starting
point for “higher-order pattern[s]” (Weick & Roberts, 1993, p.
374). These actions of communication and information
exchange make tacit assumptions explicit or, as Weick and
Roberts (1993) argue, an integration of feeling, thinking, and
willing between individuals that allows for a qualitatively new
(i.e. objectified) boundedness to coalesce.
Table 1 summarizes the relevant theoretical input from the
three theoretical perspectives which are used as conceptual tools
in our attempt to describe the process of developing network
insight, and to analyze our empirical data.
3. Network insight: managing the amalgamation process
Having reviewed the theoretical foundation of this study, we
now define the underlying principles and describe managerial
Table 1
Input from the three management perspectives
Network Knowledge Collective mind
Markets are seen as
networks of actors
Knowledge is seen as an
achievement that needs
to be worked for
Collective mind is seen










need to be managed:
Collective mind starts


















Fig. 1. Developing network insights.
172 S. Mouzas et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 37 (2008) 167–180activities for developing network insight. Network insight is
understood as a network property, a structure as well as a
process (Weick, 1988; Weick & Roberts, 1993). The proposed
frame is informed by the conceptual perspectives of network,
knowledge, and collective mind. It is depicted as a funnel (see
Fig. 1), and illustrates a process of amalgamating dispersed
network pictures in a business network. The amalgamation
process defines the mechanism of how the real, and subse-
quently the objectified view becomes apparent. It does not,
however, occur instantly. There are a number of enablers and
barriers to amalgamation of cognitive views and it is a time-
consuming process that needs to be managed.
Managers' cognitive views or ‘pictures’ can be described
analytically as a) impressions, b) images and c) identities.
Impressions include managerial expectations, such as the
expected return on assets, expected performance or certain
roles within a business network. They also include aspirations
or concerns with regard to activities, i.e. programs of action.
Images are framed by the sense-making of the business network
and the extant knowledge the competitive commercial game.
They are the managers' mental maps that reduce important
network properties, logical links and rules into simple and
manageable representations. Furthermore, identities refer to
managers' self-perceptions and their sedimented experience
from the past. However, network pictures of individual
members of a management team are usually not enacted
unilaterally and immediately but trigger an exchange process
within and between companies. These network exchanges
involve an on-going negotiation among actors. Normative
expectations might clash, past dispositions might shape the
interactions, and contextual variables will mediate the process.
Often external data is used to ‘validate’ or ‘falsify’ certain
aspects of shared elements of network pictures. Any synthesis
reached at conclusion can still consist of many controversial
elements within a shared understanding, e.g. based on
misunderstandings, hidden agendas or perceptual opaqueness
(Weick, 1990). Through this amalgamation process and the
corresponding gain in clarity of sense-making, network insight
is potentially created; thereby embedding some new options andpossibilities for managing in networks. Possibilities are open to
each organization through the comprehension of non-task
related network properties. ‘Insight’, therefore, is not an in-
dividual interpretation that is inferred from a variety of cues; it
is collective and objectified.
Our analysis of all these characteristics reveals three
important enablers and barriers to the success of arriving at
‘network insight’ consisting of information, data and knowl-
edge: firstly, the amalgamation process requires multilateral
exchange; secondly, the amalgamation process is a managerial
activity that is embedded in manifold rationalities and thirdly
any amalgamation effort is time-consuming and simply not
feasible without the efficacy of recursive time. Multilateral
exchange, manifold rationality and recursive time are inherent
complexities which impede the process of developing network
insight. However, a better understanding of their characteristics,
as well as how they impact on each other, can create a powerful
platform of guiding managerial principles which could facilitate
the whole amalgamation process. As such, the barriers to
developing insight in business networks can also be seen as
enablers if managed as part of the amalgamation process (see
Fig. 2).
The operation of the three enablers/barriers to developing
network insight is characterized by the following three
concepts.
3.1. Multilateral exchange
Network insight is the amalgamated outcome of multiple
negotiations and heedful interactions at numerous differing
levels within and between organizations. A typical negotiation
process will comprise several exchanges at regional as well as at
headquarter levels, plus a plethora of related information
gathering activities, often with third parties such as professional
communities and public bodies. Consequential multilateral
exchanges introduce complexity and lack of transparency into
the interaction process which could be task specific as well as
non-task specific. Managers' openness to move beyond existing
task-specific exchanges and engage in heedful interactions is
Fig. 2. Enablers/barriers to amalgamation process.
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alternative perspectives of their surrounding network. Further-
more, linking exchanges between levels as well as encouraging
coordination will increase the ‘heed’ of these exchanges.
3.2. Manifold rationality
The creation of network insight is based on a manifold
managerial logic. This logic is manifold in the sense that it
emphasizes certain aspects that are important for individual
managers and diverts attention from other facets which might be
important for other managers in their surrounding networks.
Moreover, individual managers might have personal reasons for
doing things over and above what is ‘right’ for the organization
(Webster & Wind, 1972). A manifestation of manifold ra-
tionality can be found in the distinction between instrumental
rationality (“Zweckrationalität”) and value rationality (“Wer-
trationalität”) as described by Weber (1956). According to
Elster (2000), value rationality is guided by its consequences or
end, whereas instrumental rationality is guided by means.
Understanding and tolerating other managers' underlying logic
is key to the process of effective exchanges in the network
(Perrow, 1999) and thus key in developing network insight.
3.3. Recursive time
Network insight comprises an indeterminate outcome of
recurrent business practices. Time is not understood as a linear
process but as recursive practice. Organizational habits and
institutionalized forms of interactions such as periodic business
reviews, periodic task reviews, annual operating plans or annual
negotiations or contractual agreements among firms are
manifestations of recursive time. However, managers' time
perspectives are often not aligned, although rigid exchangeschedules may indicate the opposite. An example of the dif-
ferences in the underlying expectations of actors (or actor
groups) during exchanges has been provided by Snook (2000),
in his analysis of different time expectations for deliberative
processes between fighter pilots, AWACS flight controllers, and
ground controllers. Therefore, managers need to understand the
characteristics and the importance of time for other actors as
well as the exchange process itself.
The result of managing the complexities of multilateral
exchanges, manifold rationalities and recurrent practices is
described as network insight. It is an objectified managerial
outcome that includes “hard elements” which are measurable in
terms of concrete deliverables for customers or unique methods,
innovative practices or organizational procedures, as well as
“soft elements” such as organizational learning and differential
knowledge within a business network. Both hard and soft
elements transcend the task-specific knowledge base of in-
dividual managerial cognitions. Thus, before discussing any
guidelines for managing the process towards developing net-
work insight, we will first proceed with testing this amalgam-
ation process in two illustrative examples. The next sections
will describe the applied methodology as well as the exem-
plifying cases.
4. Research method
This study is integral to an empirical investigation that
started in September 2002 with the objective of identifying how
companies mobilize other actors in their surrounding business
network to work within the plans they develop. One of the most
intriguing empirical findings of that research, articulated as the
‘first challenge’, demonstrated a considerable lack of network
insight. We found that managers were preoccupied with their
own tasks and concerns and were not always willing or able to
develop a managerial capability to learn and mobilize other
actors in their communities of practice, nor were they willing to
engage in interactions that would result in common-held knowl-
edge. Their ‘network pictures’ were consequently simplistically
oriented towards immediate task satisfaction, allowing only a
myopic view of the relevant business network, as well as the
options available to them to penetrate into their cognitive maps.
This was evident in the managers' limited awareness about their
supplier's, customers' and other actors' existing concerns, and
the lack of knowledge on available strategic options or the
ignorance of where certain capabilities and resources reside in a
wider business network.
During 2003 and 2004, we critically revisited the cross-
sectional empirical evidence in light of our main research target
of understanding how and why organizations of different types
develop or fail to develop network insight. The field work
included seven companies and 44 in-depth interviews of senior
managers with business managers, key account managers,
purchasing managers, sales managers, marketing managers and
corporate lawyers who participated in the initial research.
Interviews with related organizations and actors (e.g. customers
or suppliers) supplemented these findings within a network
context that was defined around the relevant focal companies. In
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agers from sales and purchasing, project management and
general management, representing a variety of industries as well
as some of the best known blue chip manufacturers that included
consumer goods and pharmaceutical companies, producers of
semiconductors and also service providers (telecommunication,
grocery retailing, and water suppliers). Following the method of
case study research (Easton, 1995; Eisenhardt, 1989; Halinen &
Törnoos, 2005; Pettigrew, 1990; Tsoukas, 1989; Yin, 2003a), the
current enquiry was based on written and verbal replies, multiple
sources of information and triangulation of data (Janesick, 1994;
Yin, 2003a,b) in order to maintain a chain of evidence and
develop converging lines of investigation. Field observations
of interactions with managers, impromptu chats, social events
(e.g. lunch, coffee breaks), meetings etc. were logged shortly
after they occurred into a self devised field-tracking-system.
These were entered into a ‘chronological events list’ and served
as a filter/index to the wider set of observations. This was crucial
in the selection of ‘significant’ situations, which were selected for
closer examination and triangulation of primary data (Janesick,
1994). A field/personal diary was also periodically written to
supplement the formal material gathered, and provided reflec-
tions on the research as a whole. Additional electronic documents
received via email and pertaining to all aspects of the companies
involved were retained for analysis. In addition, we made use of
publicly available data relevant for the cases.
Using the conceptual tools a) multilateral exchange,
b) manifold rationality, and c) recursive time, the analysis of
empirical data involved critical examination, evaluation,
categorization and recombination of findings. As such, we
attempted to ‘generalize’ our findings by integrating several
views and accounts of what happened. Whilst this does not
overcome all the limitations of an interpretative research view, it
safeguards against a purely subjective and focal company-
oriented representation. Therefore, the aim of the analysis was
to evaluate, test and determine the extent to which existing
knowledge claims do, or do not, truly represent or correspond to
the world (Hunt, 1976, 1983). Thus our goal in data analysis
was to link the conceptual tools with the empirical observations.
This link was established through several cycles, moving be-
tween theoretical ideas and data on business practices. In our
analysis, the observed world of developing network insight is an
open system in which events do not invariably follow a
determined pattern; instead they are subject to underlying
processes and activities. For this reason, we needed to engage in
analytical experimentation to identify the generality of pro-
cesses that produced the events which were experienced.
However, we distinguish generality from recurrent regularities.
Our generality is ascribed to the ‘operation’ of processes which
produced the observed events. Processes operate as mechanisms
which may “… act in their normal way even when expected
regularities do not occur” (Tsoukas, 1989, p. 551). They are
triggers that answer ‘why’ and ‘how’ certain events occur. For
this reason, processes differ from the deterministic or stochastic
association of events. Rather, they are necessary mechanisms of
acting in a set of circumstances. We will now examine the
circumstances of two exemplifying cases.5. Exemplifying case A: successes in developing network
insight
5.1. SABMiller
The growth of a small local brewery in South Africa into the
substantial SABMiller that exists today must rank as an
extraordinary success story in terms of international expansion;
and provides an excellent example of a company working
purposefully to develop its network insight.
South African Breweries started brewing Castle Lager in
South Africa during 1895, and listed on the Johannesburg Stock
Exchange in 1897. Almost a century later, in 1999, it moved its
primary listing to the London Stock Exchange. Although
international expansion dated back to 1910 with the formation
of Rhodesian Breweries, it was only since the 1990s that the
company has aggressively pursued international expansion.
This was crowned by the formation of SABMiller in 2002,
when SAB acquired 100% of Miller Brewing Company, then
the second largest in America. The company now turns over
some $15 bn a year, distributes to over forty countries on all
continents, and it ranks among the top three brewers in more
than thirty countries. This has been achieved while operating in
many markets characterized by downward pressure on prices,
commoditising market places, and increases in global market
share among the larger players.
Apart from the changing market conditions, there have been
other impediments to the international expansion. This growth
has been achieved sometimes against great odds. For example,
although access to appropriate technology was seen as a
potentially problematic issue in moving into the large Chinese
market, it was noted that the company's managers “were
accustomed to managing factories with unreliable energy
sources, inconsistent supply and delivery of inputs, unskilled
labour pools, and the use of older technology and plant
infrastructure” (Everatt, 2000).
In seeking to move from being a minor player to a global
force in the industry, the company was prepared to develop a
realistic, fact-based understanding of the marketplace, breaking
with accepted conventions in a number of ways. SABMiller's
managers were prepared to move beyond their extant
understanding of doing business and to redefine their past
identity as members of a small local brewery in South Africa.
As noted by the CEO GrahamMackay, “Global beer businesses
were supposed to come from Europe or America, developing
markets were supposed to be poor or unreliable investments,
and a third-world business couldn't compete in the first world”
(Mackay, 2005).
The company has managed to do this through a combination
of developing a clear understanding of each new market that
they entered, and also by amalgamating management practices
when necessary. This included a systematic analysis of key
performance indicators such as market shares, revenues and
earnings in each country; an exercise which was rigorously
repeated, and which built on gaining incremental experience
and knowledge in terms of both content and process. It was
done using a three-phased approach of (1) acquisition and
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ment, and (3) leveraging positions and brands; (Clark, 2005)
and by applying best practice in marketing across the different
areas. Cognizant of the fact that there is a growing backlash
against ‘anti-social’ products, the company has outstanding
marketing and yet also actively addresses consumers' alcohol
misuse. This is evidenced, for example, in a campaign in
Southern Africa which was implemented under the slogan
“Drink responsibly, Drive Responsibly, Live Responsibly”; by
adhering to the ‘Kompania Piwowarske’ voluntary code in
Poland, and the Miller Brewing Company's range of “Live
Responsibly” activities in the USA.
It is this systematic approach, its focus on replication of
marketing practices over time that has given the company its
competitive strength. Marketing practices involved an active
mobilization of other companies such as suppliers, advertising
and promotion agencies as well as retailers. Regular and in-
tensive exchange with other companies allowed SABMiller's
managers to challenge their previous assumptions and to initiate
and test new business propositions in form of pilot projects or
test markets. SABMiller's managers thus started to develop a
deep understanding about their suppliers' and customers' con-
cerns and the available possibilities for action. It was through the
interactionwith other players that the three-phased approachwas
so effective. In addition, the company places great emphasis on
both achieving measurable results — via metrics such as
earnings per share, and earnings per hectolitre brewed; and also
on making sure that the right teams are in place in different
cultural settings, aided by diverse and frequent interactions at all
organizational levels. By using this dual approach, it has man-
aged to replicate its business model globally, yet also to manage
things differently at the local level as and when required.
5.2. Exemplifying case B: deficiencies in developing network
insight
5.2.1. International utility company Aquarius3
Aquarius is an international utility company, owned by two
European waste disposal and utility conglomerates. Aquarius
specializes in acquiring utility companies from those develop-
ing countries that want to privatize the sector. It was negotiating
a deal with the government of M-Land (GoM) in South
America. GoM invited tenders for the majority of shares in the
newly-privatized company MUS (M-land Utility Supply) that
runs the country's utility and waste services.
Aquarius submitted a bid as part of the tender without having
a fact-based view of existing possibilities. Their business
managers did not know how many other bidders were involved,
and they also did not fully comprehend crucial elements of the
underlying business plan which related to the willingness of
certain actors, such as final consumers, to pay for some
necessary infrastructure investments. A major aspect of this was3 Names of actors and countries have been sanitised due to confidentiality
issues. Therefore, no reference is made to publicly available data in this case (in
contrast with the SABMiller case). because this would allow an identification
of the company.their reluctance to interact not just with their specific negotiation
partner (RB) but also other relevant actors. In fact, Aquarius
was at this point primarily inward-focused and did not engage in
interactions or exchanges that would enhance trust, information
transparency, or clarify expectations within the relevant
exchange network. The only insight that they gained early on
(based on weak impressions gained mainly through written
exchanges) was that the country's regulatory body (RB), their
main exchange and negotiation partner, was in fact weak and
followed the instructions of GoM. Any interactions at that early
stage were purely task-centered, involving only specific man-
agers from one hierarchy, driven by argument-based exchanges
without fostering mutual trust. Face-to-face meetings were rare.
Nonetheless, Aquarius was driven by specific normative expec-
tations and past dispositions. Aquarius' managers felt the
pressure from their parent institutions because their company
had not completed a deal for 2 years. Therefore, their own
identity as managers of a business unit was under threat if they
could not clinch this deal. Interaction patterns were conse-
quently focused on communicating with and ‘managing’ of
their internal constituencies.
During the negotiations and the subsequent information
gathering, it became eventually clear to Aquarius that they were
the only serious bidder. However, the managers had started
negotiations with a very lucrative offer to GoM regarding the
amount of investments that they intended to undertake.
According to their subsequent information regarding competitive
offers (which were gathered in a piecemeal fashion and took time
to be aggregated because they emanated from interactions on
lower hierarchy levels), they had to decrease these investment
promises. GoM constantly used the original numbers as a
negotiation ploy. While this was relatively successful at the
beginning, Aquarius realized midway through the negotiations
that GoM could not pull out of the deal (however, Aquarius was
in the same position). Eventually, the negotiation equilibrium
accrued which ‘oiled’ the subsequent synthesis of the positions
that they took to the negotiation table. This happened because by
now a critical number of interactions had happened between the
main negotiating partners which allowed the implicit expecta-
tions and the relative power positions to be gauged by either
party. In the end, Aquarius got the deal; which was around three-
quarters of the overall shares.
However, it transpired that Aquarius' managers had not
reached a satisfactory level of understanding of their surround-
ing network: further interactions with GoM, RB and also with
other competitors caused Aquarius' managers to realize that
they could have got the deal for considerably less money, as
GoM urgently needed liquidity forms of cash because of the
country's debt situation. They also realized that they did not
have meaningful interactions with a number of crucial network
actors: such as the final consumers. Dealing with this important
network constituency at this late point in the deal for the first
time caused Aquarius to gain new information. Consequently, it
became clear that the underlying business model for the share
valuation was totally skewed: Aquarius did not recover any
investment costs from final consumers due to a militant
unwillingness to pay. As a consequence, the new business
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required. This time, Aquarius' managers had gained some
additional contextual insight into the general situation, acquired
through more frequent and often non-task related contacts with
government officials. However, this was not ‘planned’ but
resulted from the need for more direct interaction patterns due to
the fact that all parties were now involved in the implementation
phase of the project. The company was able to use threats of
pulling out of the deal; which would have destabilized the
government. It was 6 months before a general election, and
GoM actually had not made the privatization deal public. Any
revelations would have destroyed GoM's re-election chances.
Consequently, Aquarius was able to negotiate better tariffs and
investment conditions. Although the re-negotiation ended in a
viable business model for both sides, the Aquarius director lost
his job due to the way he managed the initial negotiations and
the lack of interactions with relevant network constituencies.
5.3. Case analyses
The first exemplary case (SABMiller) describes successes in
managing the amalgamation process, with interactions helping
the focal company as well as other network partners to form
overlapping expectations and knowledge, while the second case
(Aquarius) demonstrates how an amalgamation process that
may lead to network insight can be blocked. It is, therefore,
useful to look at the operation of different enablers/barriers to
amalgamation process and analyze the circumstances where
extant knowledge remains, as well as the circumstances where
extant knowledge is successfully enriched with new, appropri-
ate information, data and knowledge, in such a way that
managers can use it practically in their organization. Multilat-
eral exchange, manifold rationality, and recursive time are three
inherent complexities which may facilitate or impede the
managerial process of developing network insight. Table 2
displays how these complexities are impacting on a number of
concrete episodes in our cases.
Case A provides evidence that SABMiller fostered a
multilateral exchange with diverse interactions at all organiza-
tional levels, with the acquisition and establishing the footprint,
as well as with the systematic leveraging of positions and
brands. Case B, on the other hand, shows that Aquarius engaged
in protracted and suboptimal interactions with an overall un-
satisfactory result in the initial stage. In terms of static elements,
Aquarius' managers had a very simplistic initial network
understanding. Notably, the motivation of crucial players, such
as consumers, was not understood; furthermore, interactions did
not happen across hierarchy levels and they were mainly task-
driven and impersonal. The first case, SABMiller, demonstrates
that the company managed to embrace a manifold rationality
that was characterized by a fact-based understanding, measur-
able results and the use of metrics (based on shared views of all
network partners regarding their importance) which included
multiple performance indicators such as market shares, earnings
per share, and earnings per hectoliter brewed but also a number
of socially responsible codes. The use of objectified metrics
enabled SABMiller to embrace multiple rationalities and assesstheir performance in relation to the performance of other actors
and, thereby, elaborate a common understanding of the world.
This ‘common knowledge’ (Grant, 1996; Grant & Baden-
Fuller, 2004) was not represented in one individual person but
was ‘collective’ (Wiley, 1988; Weick & Roberts, 1993) in the
sense that it was shared across the network.
In comparison, the second case, Aquarius, demonstrates the
existence of constrained rationalities which were driven by
normative expectations and past dispositions. Aquarius' man-
agers ‘under-managed’ their existing knowledge pool by fo-
cusing on their own extant knowledge. Several knowledge
aspects became sedimented in their network pictures and they
did not engage in extensive ‘recursive activities’ such as regular
business reviews or on-going negotiations with other actors in
the network. Hence, extant knowledge was never challenged.
Expectations regarding Aquarius' performance by its stake-
holders acted as barriers to intensified interactions and con-
sequently inhibited the knowledge amalgamation process. This
resulted in the managers' perception that a deal was needed to
reaffirm their organizational identity. This meant that past
dispositions (i.e. business models that had worked in previous
negotiations) were used without testing them in interactions and
negotiations and consequently were implemented without
adapting them to the specific network situation at hand.
Hence, knowledge aspects of local context were constantly
neglected by the managers, who were ‘inward’ looking in their
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players' frequently over time, and so enrich their understanding
of exchange system on which the deal was negotiated. While
Aquarius' managers were blinkered by a ‘given’ mental model
(previous success characteristics, initial understanding of net-
work pictures) they pushed aside new, and often, puzzling
contracting information (if they actually were able to gain these
information at all) Instead, SABMiller's managers engaged in
heedful and frequent interactions with other actors in their
surrounding network. This allowed the successful replication of
business models and best practices over time globally, despite
the existence of local impediments. This is, for example, dem-
onstrated in the company's entry into the large Chinese market.
SABMiller's managers respected the inherent contextual
circumstances and repeatedly focused on the consolidation
and value realization over time. In contrast, Aquarius managers
were forced to exhibit ‘heed’ in their interaction characteristics
only in order to remedy the situation and make sense of the vast
amount of contradictory data that evolved in the implementation
phase (i.e. when it became clear that the business model was
falling through). Consequently, in the second, renegotiation
phase, Aquarius' managers were much more sensitive towards
the local context, and had a better understanding of multilateral
exchanges. They integrated and shared their insights freely with
other network partners in order to find a common, objectified
solution.
The cases demonstrate the need for managers in networks to
move beyond their extant knowledge and access new, appro-
priate information, data and knowledge, and use it systemati-
cally in their business activities. The empirical findings show
that the insight that is necessary for a single company to
improve its performance and deliver products and services that
are valued in the marketplace is not available in a concentrated
form and certainly cannot be encapsulated entirely by a single
actor (Becker, 2001; Hayek, 1945; Tsoukas, 1996). Increasingly
the information, data and knowledge that a firm needs to draw
upon is dispersed in many different organizations. This dis-
persion creates the need for managers to secure access to other
interrelated actors and manage the process of producing net-
work insight on an on-going basis via interactions and exchange
activities. Furthermore, the two exemplifying cases provide
evidence that the complexities of multilateral exchanges,
manifold rationalities and recurrent practices provide a platform
for the understanding of factual physical and social artifacts
involved in this process; they are enablers and barriers to
developing network insight (see Table 2).
6. Conclusion
Weick (1993) reminds us that “… organizations can be good
at decision making and still falter. They falter because of
deficient sense-making.” (p. 636). Individual cognitive ‘pic-
tures’ held by managers as sense-making representations are not
sufficient to incorporate the contextual elements of managerial
action and an incomplete knowledge of the context may lead to
inappropriate action. Organizations need on a continual basis
network insight expressed in fact-based information, data andknowledge and they need processes to develop this. Our illustra-
tive cases demonstrate that the managerial process of integrating
dispersed pieces of network pictures is a real challenge for any
company; and that a better understanding of developing network
insight can provide three significant advantages.
Firstly, moving out of the boundaries of rational, task-related
actions, we can increase our understanding of actors' potentials
and their perceived options. Our findings indicate that existing
potentials do not come solely from the idiosyncratic capabilities
of companies but are essentially derived from the firm's
membership in networks of exchange relationships. This aspect
becomes tremendously important when organizations enter new
business networks where they have not operated before. To
escape the narrow boundaries of rational, task-related actions,
such as the task of a bid described in our Case B, managers need
to move beyond their own extant knowledge (pictures) and
open themselves by building new relationships and heedful
interactions (exchanges).
Secondly, a wider managerial perspective that rests on the
potential inherent in multilateral exchange, manifold rationality
and recursive time helps us understand the essential role of
interaction and negotiation to resolve conflicts in every aspect
of business life (Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Sebenius, 1992). It
appears that managers are unable to fully construct and explain
in advance different views held by other actors; but these views
are dynamic and continually re-configured through the on-
going negotiations undertaken within networks of exchange
relationships (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999). This underlines
the importance of understanding the rationalities inherent in
unarticulated interests of other actors, as well as the importance
of institutionalizing business forms of frequent interactions
through periodic business and task reviews. Without a suf-
ficiently deep understanding of others' logic, and without the
existence of recurrent organizational practices, managers will
not be able to conduct multiple exchanges; and without com-
prehensive multilateral exchanges with other actors managers
diminish their ability to embrace possibilities that exist in their
surrounding business networks.
Thirdly, an understanding of the process of developing in-
sight helps us to appreciate the creation of competitive advan-
tage within a business network, as well as for the business
network itself. By developing insight in business networks,
managers gain clarity of sense-making. The created insight
incorporates new ways and options for managing in networks of
exchange relationships. These new potentials are not individual
views that are inferred from a variety of cues. Instead, they are
objectified and collective possibilities. Thus ‘insight’ is
manifested in information, data and knowledge, in such a way
that managers can use it practically in their organization for
differential positioning and strategic action. Therefore, devel-
oping insight can lead to a better assessment of the appro-
priateness of managerial action.
Despite the relevance of developing network insight, our
findings demonstrate a considerable lack of ‘insight’ by many
organizations, be it in specific situations regarding clinching a
deal, or in non-specific situations regarding an assessment of the
driving forces within a network. The evidence hitherto is that
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pieces of specialized knowledge held by various actors in their
surrounding business networks. However, by understanding the
barriers to developing insight, managers can recognize that the
process of amalgamating dispersed pieces of inherent possibil-
ities is manageable.
7. Managerial implications
Managers need to understand that the process that ultimately
leads to developing insight does not occur automatically but
needs to be guided carefully. Network insight is linked to
individual and collective ‘action’ (Tsoukas, 2000) which has to
be ‘heedful’ (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Therefore, based on our
analysis of business cases, we propose a set of guiding prin-
ciples which could be used in understanding, developing and
improving insight in business networks. Managers and manage-
ment teams could carry, champion and mediate the following set
of guiding principles:
• Extant knowledge is an inherent trap that can be avoided.
Managers' knowledge should be tested and improved
through several layers of heedful interactions and exchanges
within the organization and with different exchange partners.
• Exchanges need to take place at all possible levels, at
regional units and at headquarters, internally between
different departments and individuals as well as externally
between organizations and other groups and public
bodies. Cross-hierarchical information exchange is to be
encouraged.
• Managers' openness to emerging business opportunities
requires the inclusion of non-task related exchanges and the
ability to embrace new possibilities. This is often linked to a
non-task related understanding of contextual variables alien
to the managers' cognitive ‘pictures’ in business networks.
• Managers' underlying raison d'être should not divert their
attention from other rationales, motivations, and restrictions
which might be important for other actors and organizations.
• Managers need to distinguish between value rationality
guided by its consequences and instrumental rationality
guided by its means. To do so, managers could move beyond
assessing articulated issues and positions, and improve their
understanding of other managers' underlying interests.
• Knowledge needs to become objectified in form of shared
data and shared information so that it can be used practically
for differentiating positioning. Individual knowledge or
company-centered knowledge is not sufficient for exchange
insights.
• The achievement of objectified knowledge requires more
than mere search endeavors. It requires managers' subse-
quent action to test and codify what is feasible in their
surrounding network. Examples of subsequent managerial
action include pilot projects or test markets.
• Managers should think of time as recurrent practice of
periodical business reviews, negotiation episodes or con-
tractual agreements. These are resolutions that contribute to
an incremental development of insight in business networks.Following these guiding principles, managers' effort to find
what is possible in their surrounding business networks
becomes a way of life. It is an indeterminate managerial
effort through multilateral interactions. Given the inherent
difficulties involved in developing and sustaining this effort,
managers need to grasp the challenge of developing insight in
business networks seriously and guide the involved process
heedfully.
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